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Abstract
One of the main difficulty concerning the nature of the continuum
is to do justice, inside the set theoretical Cantorian framework, to
the classical conception (from Aristotle to Thom, via Kant, Peirce,
Brentano, Husserl and Weyl) according to which the continuum is a
non-compositional, cohesive, primitive, and intuitive datum. This pa-
per investigates such possibilities, from Go¨del to Woodin, of modelling
inside a ZFC -universe the transcendence of the intuitive continuum
w.r.t. its symbolic determination.
Keywords: constructive universe, continuum, Go¨del, forcing, Kant,
large cardinals, Ω-logic, projective hierarchy, V = L, Woodin, 0#.
1 Introduction
One of the main general philosophical problem raised by the nature
of the continuum is the conflict between two traditions: the older
one, which can be called “neo-Aristotelian”, even if this sounds rather
vague, and the now the classical one, namely the Cantorian tradition.
According to the neo-Aristotelian tradition, the continuum is experi-
enced and thought of as a non-compositional, cohesive, primitive, and
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intuitive datum. It can be segmented into parts but these parts are
themselves continua and points are only their boundaries.
This point of view was very well defended by Kant. As soon as in
his 1770 Dissertatio, he emphasized the fact that
“a magnitude is continuous when it is not composed out of
simple elements” (AK, II, p. 399 1),
and explained that for the continuous “pure intuitions” of space and
time
“any part of time is still a time, and the simple elements
which are in time, namely the moments, are not parts but
limits between which a time takes place” (AK, II, p. 399).
“space must necessarily be conceived of as a continuous
magnitude, (...) and therefore simple elements in space are
not parts but limits” (AK, II, p. 404).
He wrote also in the “Anticipations of perception” of the Critic of
Pure Reason:
“Space and time are quanta continua because no part of
them can be given without being enclosed into limits (points
or moments) (...). Space is made up only of spaces and
time of times. Points and moments are only limits, that
is to say, simple places bounding space and time (...), and
neither space nor time can be made up of simple places,
that is of integral parts which would be given before space
and time themselves” (AK, III, p. 154).
We see that this conception of the continuum is based on mereolog-
ical properties, and especially on the concept of boundary (Grenze):
points are boundaries and boundaries are dependent entities which
cannot exist independently of the entities they bound.When there are
no explicit boundaries, the continuum is characterized by the “fusion”
of its parts.2 Moreover, Leibniz’s principle of continuity holds (every
function is continuous).
1AK refers to the collected works Kants gesammelte Schriften, Preussische Akademie
der Wissenschaften.
2It is very easy to construct a model of such a mereology. Let us take R with its
standard topology and posit that the only admissible parts U of R are its open subsets
U ∈ Pad(R). Let U, V ∈ Pad(R). The complement ¬U of U is the interior Int(U) of its
classical complement U (which is a closed subset). Therefore U ∩¬U = ∅ but U ∪¬U 6= R.
Conversely; if U ∪ V = R then U ∩ V 6= ∅. This means that, for the open mereology, R is
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Even after the Cantor-Dedekind arithmetization, the “neo-Aristotelian”
non-compositionality of the continuum kept on raising fondamental
problems for some of the greatest philosophers, mathematicians, and
psychologists, such as Peirce, Brentano, Stumpf (who elaborated the
key concept of “fusion”: Verschmelzung), Husserl 3, or Thom (for
whom the continuum possessed an ontological primacy as a qualita-
tive homogeneous Aristotelian “homeomer”). Go¨del himself consid-
ered the real intuition of the continuum in this way and opposed it to
its set theoretical idealisation.
Peirce developed a “synechology”, “syneche” being the greek term
for “continuum”. Mathematically, he was also the first, as far as
I know, to reject the continuum hypothesis CH (2ℵ0 = ℵ1) and to
define the power c of the continuum as a large cardinal, namely an
inaccessible cardinal (if κ < c then 2κ < c). In some texts, Peirce even
explained that the continuum could be so huge that it would fail to
be a cardinal.
Husserl was the first, in the third Logical Investigation, to for-
malize the idea of a mereology, and, after him, Stanis law Lesniewski
developped the theory between 1916 and 1921. But the definition of
boundaries in a mereo(topo)logy remained up to now highly problem-
atic as it is argued, e.g., in Breysse-De Glas (2007).
All these conceptions develop the same criticism against the idea of
arithmetizing the continuum. According to them, the continuum can
be measured using systems of numbers, but no system can exhaust
the substratum it measures. They consider:
1. that a point in the continuum is a discontinuity (a mark, a local
heterogeneity, a boundary) which is like a singular individuated
“atom” which can be refered to by a symbol;
2. that quantified sentences of an appropriate predicate calculus
can be therefore interpreted in the continuum;
3. that systems of numbers can of course measure such systems of
marks and enable their axiomatic control;
4. but that the arithmetization of the continuum postulates, what’s
more, that the intuitive phenomenological continuum is reducible
to such a set-theoretic system (Cantor-Dedekind);
undecomposable. Topological boundaries ∂U are not admissible parts but only limits, and
bound both U and ¬U . Heyting used this mereotopology for defining truth in intuitionist
logic.
3Concerning the concept of Verschmelzung in Stumpf and Husserl, see. Petitot [1994].
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5. and therefore that such a reductive arithmetization is unaccept-
able for it violates the original intuitive mode of givenness of the
continuum.
Let us leave phenomenology and psychology for mathematics. Even
if we adopt a set-theoretic perspective making the continuum a set,
non-compositionality and cohesivity remain meaningful. They now
mean in particular that the continuum cannot be identified with a set
of well individuated points. It is the case in intuitionistic logic where
the law of the excluded middle, which implies that two elements a
and b of R are different or equal, and the law of comparability, which
implies a = b, or a < b, or a > b, are no longer valid. For Hermann
Weyl (1918), this intrinsic lack of individuation and localization of
points in R characterizes the continuum as an intuitive datum.
Given the close link discovered by Bill Lawvere between intuition-
istic logic and topos theory, it is not surprising that in many topo¨ı
the object R is undecomposable and all the morphisms f : R→ R are
continuous (Leibniz’s principle, see e.g. John Bell’s works 4).
But, even in the realm of classical logic and classical set theory
(that is ZFC: Zermelo-Fraenkel + axiom of choice) there exist many
evidences of the transcendence of the continuum relatively to its sym-
bolic logical control. Of course, they occur in non-standard models of
R, but these non-Archimedian models are not well-founded and will
not be analyzed here.5 I will rather focus on their status in well-
founded models V of ZFC.
So, the context of this paper will be the theory of the continuum
in universe of sets satisfying ZFC. We will see that, even in this
purely formal framework, the Kantian opposition between “intuitive”
and “conceptual” remains operating, where “conceptual” now refers
to the logical control and symbolic determination of the continuum
(as it was already the case for Kant himself who considered arith-
metic, contrary to geometry, as “conceptual” and “intellectual”, and
algebra as a calculus on “symbolic constructions”).6 The key question
remains the same: is it possible to determine completely the intuitive
continuum using logical symbolic constructions?
We will meet in the sequel an alternative opposing two different
4See in particular Bell’s contribution to this volume.
5For an introduction to non-standard analysis, see Petitot [1979], [1989] and their
bibliographies.
6Critic of Pure Reason, “Transcendental Methodology”, AK, III, p. 471.
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types of philosophies.
1. Philosophies of the first type are “minimizing”, “ontologically”
deflationist (in the sense of restricting what axioms of existence
are admissible), nominalist, and constructive. They consider that
the only meaningful content of the continuum is the part which
can be “conceptually” (that is symbolically) well determined and
that the rest is “inherently vague”. A celebrated representative
of such a perspective is Solomon Feferman who considers that
the continuum cannot be a definite mathematical object since
some of its properties, such as Cantor’s continuum hypothesis,
are not expressible by definite propositions. But, as explained
by John Steel (2004) in a criticism of Feferman:
“Taken seriously, this analysis leads us into a retreat to
some much weaker constructivist language, a retreat which
would toss out good mathematics in order to save inher-
ently vague philosophy.”
2. It is why, philosophies of the second type are, on the contrary,
“maximizing”, “ontologically” inflationist, platonist in a sophis-
ticated sense, and highly non constructive. They aim at mod-
elling inside a ZFC-universe the transcendence of the intuitive
continuum w.r.t. its logical symbolic mastery. Owing to this,
they must introduce non constructive axioms for higher infinite.
2 Preliminaries7
2.1 Axioms
We work in ZFC with the classical axioms:
Extensionality : sets are determined by their elements,
Pairing : the pair {a, b} exists for every sets a and b,
Union: the union
⋃
X = {u ∈ x ∈ X} of every set X exists,
Power set : the set P(X) = {u ⊆ X}) of subsets of every set X
exists,
Comprehension or Separation (axiom schema): if ϕ(x) is a formula,
the subset {x ∈ X : ϕ(x)} exists for every set X,
7See Jech [1978].
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Replacement (axiom schema): if y = f(x) is function (i.e. a re-
lation ϕ(x, y) s.t. ϕ(x, y) and ϕ(x, z) imply y = z), then the image
{f(x) : x ∈ X} exists for every set X,
Infinity : there exists an inductive set, that is a set I s.t. ∅ ∈ I and
if x ∈ I then x ∪ {x} ∈ I,
Regularity : all sets have minimal ∈-elements,
Choice: every family of sets Xs, s ∈ S, has a choice function
f : S → P(X) s.t. f(s) ∈ Xs for every s ∈ S (this axiom of existence
doesn’t define any specific f and is highly non constructive).
2.2 Ordinals and cardinals
Ordinals are the sets that are ∈-transitive (y ∈ X implies y ⊂ X , that
is
⋃
X ⊆ X or X ⊂ P(X)) and well-ordered by ∈. All well-ordered
sets are order-isomorphic to an ordinal. Every ordinal is a successor:
α = β + 1 or a limit ordinal α = Sup (β : β < α) (and then ∀β < α,
β + 1 < α). A limit ordinal is like an “horizon” for enumeration:
it is impossible to reach its limit in a finite number of steps. The
smallest limit ordinal is ω = N. The sum of two ordinals is their
concatenation (non commutativity: 1 +ω = ω 6= ω+1). The product
of two ordinals α.β is β-times the concatenation of α (lexicographic
order) (non commutativity: 2.ω = ω 6= ω.2 = ω + ω). An ordinal α is
a limit ordinal iff there exists β s.t. α = ω.β.
Cardinals |X| are equivalence classes of the equivalence relation of
equipotence: X eqY if there exists a bijective (i.e. one-to-one onto)
map f : X → Y . They highly depend upon the functions existing in
the ZFC-universe under consideration.
Cantor theorem. |X| < |P (X)|. 
Indeed, let f : X → P (X). Then Y = {x ∈ X : x /∈ f(x)} exists
(Comprehension axiom). But Y /∈ f(X) for if it would exist z ∈ X
with f(z) = Y , then z ∈ Y ⇔ z /∈ Y . Contradiction. 
If |A| = κ, then |P (A)| = 2κ since X ⊆ A is equivalent to its
characteristic function χX : A→ {0, 1} and χX ∈ 2
κ. Cantor theorem
implies therefore κ < 2κ.
For ordinals, cardinals numbers are the α s.t. |β| < |α| for every
β < α. They are the minimal elements in the equivalence classes
of equipotent ordinals. So every infinite cardinal is a limit ordinal.
Every well-ordered set has such a cardinal number for cardinal. These
cardinal numbers are the alephs ℵα. Each ℵα has a successor, namely
ℵ+α = ℵα+1. If α is a limit ordinal, ℵα = ωα = Supβ<α (ωβ).
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Theorem. For alephs, the sum and product operations are trivial:
ℵα + ℵβ = ℵα.ℵβ = max (ℵα,ℵβ) (the bigger takes all). 
A consequence is that if α ≤ β then ℵ
ℵβ
α = 2ℵβ . Indeed, 2ℵβ ≤
ℵ
ℵβ
α ≤
(
2ℵα
)ℵβ = 2ℵα.ℵβ = 2ℵβ . But other exponentiations raise
fundamental problems.
Under the axiom of choice AC, every set can be well-ordered and
therefore all cardinals are alephs. In particular 2ℵ0 is an aleph ℵα.
3 The underdetermination of cardinal
arithmetic in ZFC
Let V be a universe of set theory (i.e. a model of ZFC). We work in
R or in the isomorphic Baire space N = ωω. The first limit we meet
is that the axioms of ZFC are radically insufficient for determining
the cardinal arithmetic of V as it is clearly shown by the following
celebrated result.8
3.1 Easton theorem
For every ordinal α let F (α) be the power function defined by 2ℵα =
ℵF (α).
9 One can show that:
1. F is a monotone increasing function: if α ≤ β then F (α) ≤ F (β);
2. Ko¨nig’s law : cf
(
ℵF (α)
)
> ℵα, where the cofinality cf(α) of an
ordinal α is defined as the smallest cardinality χ of a cofinal (i.e.
unbounded) subset X of α (i.e. SupX = α ). For instance,
cf (ω + ω) = cf (ℵα+ω) = ω. Of course, cf(α) is a limit ordinal
and cf(α) ≤ α. The cardinal κ is called regular if cf(κ) = κ i.e.
if, as far as we start with α < κ, it is impossible to reach the
horizon of κ in less than κ steps. In some sense the length of
κ is equal to its “asymptotic” length and cannot be exhausted
before reaching the horizon. As cf(cf(κ)) = cf(κ), cf(κ) is always
regular. As cf (ℵα+ω) = ω, ℵα+ω is always singular.
10
8See Jacques Stern [1976] for a presentation.
9More generally one can consider the power function (λ, κ) 7→ λκ for each pair (λ, κ)
of cardinals.
10So a cardinal κ is singular iff κ =
⋃
i∈I
αi with |I| < κ and |αi| < κ ∀i ∈ I.
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Ko¨nig’s law is a consequence of a generalization of Cantor theorem
which says that 1 + 1 + . . . (κ times) < 2.2. . . . (κ times): if κi < λi
∀i ∈ I, then
∑
i∈I κi <
∏
i∈I λi. Let κi < 2
ℵα and λi = 2
ℵα for i < ωα.
Then
∑
i<ωα
κi <
∏
i<ωα
λi =
(
2ℵα
)ℵα = 2ℵα . Therefore with an ωα
sequence of κi < 2
ℵα it is impossible to get Sup (κi) = 2
ℵα since for
infinite cardinals Sup =
∑
.
An immediate corollary of Ko¨nig’s law is
Theorem. If κ is an infinite cardinal, κ < κcf(κ) (compare with
Cantor: κ < 2κ). 
Indeed, if κi < κ for i < cf(κ) and κ = Sup (κi) =
∑
i<cf(κ) κi then
κ =
∑
i<cf(κ) κi <
∏
i<cf(κ) κ = κ
cf(κ). 
In fact one can prove that the essential cardinals for cardinal arith-
metic are the 2κ and the κcf(κ) (Gimel function). They enable to com-
pute all the ℵ
ℵβ
α :
Theorem.11
1. If α ≤ β, then ℵ
ℵβ
α = 2ℵβ .
2. If α > β and ∃γ < α s.t. ℵ
ℵβ
γ ≥ ℵα, then ℵ
ℵβ
α = ℵ
ℵβ
γ .
3. If α > β and ∀γ < α we have ℵ
ℵβ
γ < ℵα then
(a) if ℵα is regular or cf(ℵα) > ℵβ then ℵ
ℵβ
α = ℵα;
(b) if cf(ℵα) ≤ ℵβ < ℵα then ℵ
ℵβ
α = ℵ
cf(ℵα)
α . 
If the generalized continuum hypothesis (GCH) holds, Ko¨nig’s law
is trivial because F (α) = α + 1, every cardinal ℵα+1 is regular and
therefore cf (ℵα+1) = ℵα+1 > ℵα.
The fact that ZFC radically underdetermines cardinal arithmetic
is particularly evident in Easton’s striking result:
Easton theorem. For regular cardinals ℵα, one can impose via
forcing in ZFC the power function 2ℵα = ℵF (α) for quite every func-
tion F satisfying (i) and (ii). 
For regular cardinals κ, we have κcf(κ) = κκ = 2κ but for singular
cardinals σ we have σcf(σ) =
(
σ
cf (σ)
)
2cf(σ) where
(
κ
λ
)
for κ > λ
is a sophisticated generalization of the binomial formula.
The proof of Easton theorem uses iterated Cohen forcing.
11See Jech [1978], p. 49.
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3.2 Cohen forcing
Cohen forcing (1963)12 allows to construct in a very systematic way
“generic” extensions N of inner models M of ZF or ZFC (that is
transitive ∈-submodels M ⊂ V of ZF or ZFC with On ⊆M) where
some desired properties become valid.
Suppose for instance that, starting with a ground inner model M
of ZFC in V , we want to construct another inner model N where
ωM1 (that is the cardinal ω1 = ℵ1 as defined in M) collapses and
becomes countable. We need to have at our disposal in N a surjec-
tion f : ω → ωM1 that, by definition of ω
M
1 , cannot belong to M .
Suppose nevertheless that such an f exists. Then for every n the
restriction f |n= (f(0), . . . , f(n− 1)) exists and is an element of the
ground model M . Let us therefore consider the set P = {p} of finite
sequences p = (α0, . . . , αn−1) of countable ordinals αi < ω
M
1 of M .
Such p are called forcing conditions and must be interpreted as forc-
ing f |n= p. The set P exists, is well defined in M , and is endowed
with a natural partial order “q ≤ p iff p ⊆ q”13. If f exists, we can
consider G = {f |n}n∈N which is a subset of P in V s.t. ∪G = f . But
as f /∈M , G cannot be a subset of P in M .
If f exists, it is trivial to verify that G satisfies the following prop-
erties:
1. Gluing and restriction conditions (see topos theory): if p, q ∈ G,
then p and q are initial segments of f and are compatible in the
sense that p ≤ q or q ≤ p and therefore there exists a common
smaller element r ∈ G satisfying r ≤ p, r ≤ q.
2. for every n ∈ ω, there exists p ∈ G s.t. n ∈ dom(p) (i.e.
dom(f) = ω).
3. for every M -countable ordinal α < ωM1 , there exists p ∈ G s.t.
α ∈ range(p) (i.e. range(f) = ωM1 , it is the fundamental condi-
tion of surjectivity for the collapsing of ωM1 in N).
Cohen’s idea is to construct sets G in V satisfying these properties
and to show that extending the ground inner model M by such a G
yields an appropriate inner model N = M [G] which is the smaller
inner model of V containing M and G.
So, one supposes that a partially ordered set of forcing conditions
P is given. A subset of conditions D ⊆ P is called dense if for every
12Awarded a Fields Medal in 1966, Paul Cohen died on March 23, 2007.
13That is q < p means that q forces a better approximation of f than p.
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p ∈ P there is a smaller d ≤ p belonging to D. One then defines
generic classes G ⊆ P of conditions. G /∈M is generic over M iff:
(i) p ∈ G and p ≤ q ∈ P implies q ∈ G,
(ii) for every p, q ∈ G, there exists a common smaller r ∈ G satisfying
r ≤ p, r ≤ q,
(iii) for every dense set D of conditions D ∈M (be careful: D ∈M ,
D ⊆ P ∈M , G ⊆ P , but G /∈ M), there exists p ∈ D such that
p ∈ G (i.e. G ∩D 6= ∅).
Properties (i) and (ii) mean that G is a filter for the order ≤. If G
is generic, the properties (2) and (3) above are automatically satisfied
since the sets of conditions Dn = {p ∈ P : n ∈ dom(p)} for n ∈ ω
and Eα = {p ∈ P : α ∈ range(p)} for α < ω
M
1 are dense: (2) means
G ∩Dn 6= ∅ and (3) means G ∩Eα 6= ∅.
Cohen’s main theorem. There exists a ZFC-model A = M [G]
such that (1) M is an inner model of A, (2) G is not a set in M but
is a set in A, (3) if A′ is another model statisfying (1) et (2), then
there exists an elementary embedding j : A ≺ A′ such that j(A) is an
inner model of A′ and j|M = Id(M), (4) A is essentially unique. 
If j : A ≺ A′ is an embedding of a model A in a model A′,
elementarity means that A′ has exactly the same first-order theory
as A in the language LA where there exist names for every element
of A (that is for every set x and first-order formula ϕ, A |= ϕ(x) iff
A′ |= ϕ (j (x)). So, in the first-order case, A′ adds only indiscernible
elements. A less constraining relation is elementary equivalence: A
and A′ are elementary equivalent, A ≡ A′, if they have the same first-
order theory. In that case, elements of A characterized by first-order
sentences can be substituted for other elements of A′. It is no longer
the case for an elementary embedding.
An essential feature of forcing extensions is that it is possible to
describe M [G] using the language LG which is the language L of M
extended by a new symbol constant for G. As was emphasized by
Patrick Dehornoy (2003), forcing is
“as a field extension whose elements are described by poly-
nomials defined on the ground field”.
In particular, the validity of a formula ϕ in M [G] can be coded
by a forcing relation p  ϕ defined in M . The definition of p  ϕ
is rather technical but an excellent intuition is given by the idea of
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“localizing” truth, p being interpreted as a local domain (as an open
set of some topological space), and p  ϕ meaning that ϕ is “locally
true everywhere” on p.
Forcing theorem. For every generic G ⊆ P , M [G] |= ϕ iff there
exists a p ∈ G s.t. p  ϕ. 
Using forcing, we can add to R (i.e. to P(ω)) new elements called
generic reals. Let P be the partial order of binary finite sequences
p = (p(0), . . . , p(n − 1)). If G ⊆ P is generic, f = ∪G is a map f :
ω → {0, 1} which is the characteristic function f = 1A of a new subset
A ⊆ ω and A /∈ M . Indeed, if g : ω → {0, 1} defines a subset B ⊆ ω
which belongs toM, then the set of conditions Dg = {p ∈ P : p * g} ∈
M is dense (if p is any finite sequence it can be extended to a sequence
long enough to be different from g) and therefore G ∩ Dg 6= ∅. But
this means f 6= g.
To prove the negation ¬CH of CH, one adds to M a great num-
ber of generic reals. More precisely, one embeds ωM2 into {0, 1}
ω (iso-
morphic to R) using as forcing conditions the set P of finite bi-
nary sequences of ωM2 × ω. If G is generic, then f = ∪G is a map
f : ωM2 × ω → {0, 1}, that is an ω
M
2 -family f = {fα}α<ωM2
of generic
reals fα : ω → {0, 1}. Using density arguments one shows that f yields
an embedding ωM2 →֒ {0, 1}
ω in M [G] and that ωM2 doesn’t collapse
in M [G] (because P is ω-saturated, i.e. there doesn’t exist in P any
infinite countable subset of incompatible elements). This implies im-
mediately ¬CH.
Easton theorem is proved by iterating such constructions and adding
to every regular ℵα as many new subsets as it is necessary to have
2ℵα = ℵF (α).
3.3 Absoluteness
Many philosophers and logicians which are “deflationist” regarding
mathematical “ontology” consider that the only sentences having a
well determined truth-value are those the truth-value of which is the
same in all models of ZFC, and that sentences the truth-value of
which can change depending on the chosen model are “inherently
vague”. Such an antiplatonist conception has drastic consequences.
Indeed, contrary to first order arithmetic, which is ZF -absolute, that
is invariant relative to extensions of the universe (Scho¨nfield theorem),
all structures and notions such as N , R, Card(χ), x→ P(x), x→ |x|,
and second order arithmetic, are not ZF-absolute. They can vary
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widely from one model to another and can’t have absolute truth value
in ZF . This “vagueness” is one of the main classical arguments of
antiplatonists against non-constructive set theories. But, it has been
emphasized by Hugh Woodin in his 2003 paper Set theory after Rus-
sell. The journey back to Eden that vagueness is not an admissible
argument against platonism and shows only that it is necessary to
classify the different models of ZF and ZFC. As he explained also
in his talk at the Logic Colloquium held in Paris in 2000 (quotation
from Dehornoy, 2003, p. 23):
“There is a tendency to claim that the Continuum Hypoth-
esis is inherently vague and that this is simply the end of
the story. But any legitimate claim that CH is inherently
vague must have a mathematical basis, at the very least a
theorem or a collection of theorems. My own view is that
the independence of CH from ZFC, and from ZFC to-
gether with large cardinal axioms, does not provide this
basis. (...) Instead, for me, the independence results for
CH simply show that CH is a difficult problem.”
In fact, the strong variability of the possible models of ZFC is an
argument in favor of the irreducibility of the continuum to a set of
points which can be “individuated” by a symbolic description.
To tackle this problem, we must look at two opposed strategies,
both introduced by Go¨del, one being “minimalist” (“ontologically”
deflationist) and the other “maximalist” (“ontologically” inflationist),
and first introduce some classes of sets of reals.
4 Borel and projective hierarchies
In descriptive set theory, one works in R or in N = ωω or in {0, 1}ω,
and, more generally, on metric, separable, complete, perfect (closed
without isolated points) spaces X (Polish spaces). One considers in X
different “nicely” definable classes of subsets Γ. The first is the Borel
hierarchy constructed from the open sets by iterating the operations
of complementation and of “projection” X × ω → X . If P ⊆ X × ω
(that is, if P is a countable family of subsets Pn ⊆ X ), one considers
the subset of X defined by ∃ωP = {x ∈ X | ∃n P (x, n)}.14 It is the
union
⋃
n∈ω
Pn.
14We identify predicates ϕ(x), P (x, n), etc. with their extensions.
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The Σ01 are the open subsets of X , the Π
0
1 = ¬Σ
0
1 are the closed
subsets, ∆01 = Π
0
1 ∩ Σ
0
1 the clopen subsets, and the Borel hierarchy B
is defined by:
Π0n =
{
¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ Σ0n
}
= ¬Σ0n, Σ
0
n+1 = ∃
ω¬Σ0n = ∃
ωΠ0n, ∆
0
n = Π
0
n∩Σ
0
n.
It can be shown that this hierarchy is strict :
Σ0n
ր ց
∆0n ∆
0
n+1
ց ր
Π0n
One then defines the higher hierarchy of projective sets using a
supplementary principle of construction, namely projections by con-
tinuous projections X×N → X , written ∃N . One gets a new hierarchy
beginning with the class Σ11 = ∃
NΠ01 – the so called analytic subsets –
and continuing with the classes:
Π1n =
{
¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ Σ1n
}
= ¬Σ1n, Σ
1
n+1 = ∃
N¬Σ1n = ∃
NΠ1n, ∆
1
n = Π
1
n∩Σ
1
n.
For instance, P ⊆ X is Σ11 if there exists a closed subset F ⊆ X ×N
such that: P (x) ⇔ ∃α F (x, α). In the same way, P ⊆ X is Σ12 if
there exists an open subset G ⊆ X × N × N such that: P (x) ⇔
∃α ∀β G(x, α, β), etc.
More generally, one can define projective sets in V using the cu-
mulative hierarchy of successive levels of V indexed by the class On
of ordinals: V0 = ∅, Vα+1 = {x : x ⊂ Vα} for a successor ordinal, and
Vλ =
⋃
α<λ Vα for λ a limit ordinal. Then P is projective if it is defin-
able with parameters over (Vω+1,∈). More precisely, P ⊂ Vω+1 is Σ
1
n
if it is the set of sets x s.t. (Vω+1,∈) |= ϕ(x) for a Σn formula ϕ(x),
that is a formula of the form ϕ(x) = ∃x1∀x2 . . . ψ with n quantifiers
and a ψ having only bounded quantifiers.15
As the Borel hierarchy, the projective hierarchy is strict and it is
a continuation of the Borel hierarchy according to:
Suslin theorem. B = ∆11. 
15Bounded quantifiers are of the form ∃y ∈ z and ∀y ∈ z.
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This theorem can be interpreted as a construction principle: it
asserts that the complex operation of continuous projection can be
reduced to an iteration of simpler operations of union and comple-
mentation.
There exist strict Π1n and Σ
1
n sets, which are very natural in clas-
sical analysis. For instance, in the functional space C[0, 1] of real
continuous functions on [0, 1] endowed with the topology of uniform
convergence, the subset
{f ∈ C [0, 1] | f smooth}
is Π11 (but not ∆
1
1). In the space C[0, 1]
ω of countable sequences (fi)
of functions, the subset:
{
(fi) ∈ C [0, 1]
ω
∣∣∣∣ (fi) converges for the topologyof simple convergence
}
is Π11, and the subset:
{
(fi) ∈ C [0, 1]
ω
∣∣∣∣ a sub-sequence converges for thetopology of simple convergence
}
is Σ12 and every Σ
1
2 can be represented that way (Becker [1992]):
Becker representation theorem. For every Σ12 -set S ⊆ C[0, 1]
there exists a sequence (fi) such that
S = A(fi) =

g ∈ C [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
a sub-sequence of (fi) converges
towards g for the topology
of simple convergence

 .
Another examples are given by the compact subsets K ∈ K (Rn)
of Rn: for n ≥ 3,
{K ∈ K (Rn) | K arc connected}
is Π12, and for n ≥ 4,
{K ∈ K (Rn) | K simply connected}
is also Π12.
In fact, projective sets can be considered as the “reasonably” de-
finable subsets of R.
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5 The “minimalist” strategy of the con-
structible universe
The first Go¨delian strategy for constraining the structure of ZF -
universes consisted in restricting the universe V . It is the strategy –
refered to as V = L – of constructible sets (Go¨del 1938).
To define L one substitutes, in the construction of the cumula-
tive hierarchy Vα of V by means of a transfinite recursion on the
x → P(x) operation, the power sets P(x) – which are not ZF -
absolute – with smaller sets D(x) = {y ⊆ x | y elementary} (where
“elementary” means definable by a first order formula over the struc-
ture 〈x,∈, {s|s ∈ x}〉) – which are ZF -absolute. L is then defined as
V using a transfinite recursion on ordinals: L0 = ∅ , Lα+1 = D(Lα),
Lλ =
⋃
α<λ
Lα if λ is a limit ordinal, and L =
⋃
α∈On
Lα. The absolute-
ness of L comes from the fact that each level Lα is constructed using
only unambiguous formulae and parameters belonging to the previous
stages Lβ, β < α.
Go¨del (1938, 1940) has shown that if V = L it is possible to
define a global wellordering on L, which is a very strong form of global
AC. The wellorder relation is defined by a transfinite induction on
the levels α. If x and y are of different levels their order is the order
of their respective levels. If they are of the same level, their order is
first that of the Go¨del numbers of their minimal defining formulae,
and then the order of their parameters (which are of lower order and
therefore wellordered by the induction hypothesis). Go¨del also proved
that in ZF we have (V = L) ⊢ GCH.
L is in fact the smallest inner model of V :
(i) On ⊂ L,
(ii) L is transitive: if y ∈V x and x ∈L L, then y ∈L L,
(iii) (L,∈L) is a model of ZF .
It can be defined in V by a statement L(x) = “x is constructible”
which is independent of V (ZF -absolute), and in that sense, it is a
canonical model of ZFC.
Remark. It must be emphasized that the constructible universe
L is not constructive since it contains the class On of ordinals which
is non constructive. But the characteristic property of L is that it
reduces non-constructivity exactly to On.
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In the constructible universe L there exists a ∆12-wellorder relation
< on R. According to a theorem due to Fubini, such a wellordering
cannot be Lebesgue measurable and there exist therefore in L ∆12 sets
which, despite the fact they belong to the low levels of the projective
hierarchy and are “simple” and “nice” to define, are nevertheless not
Lebesgue measurable and therefore not well-behaved.
With regards to CH, one uses the fact that the ∆12-wellorder re-
lation < on R is a fortiori Σ12, and that the Σ
1
2 are the ℵ1-Suslin sets.
If χ is an infinite cardinal, P ⊆ R is called a χ-Suslin set if it exists a
closed subset F ⊆ R × χN s.t. P = ∃χ
N
F (i.e. P is the projection of
F ). The Σ11 are, by definition, the ℵ0-Suslin sets. Indeed, if χ = ℵ0
then P = ∃RF and therefore P ∈ Σ11. A theorem of Martin says that
P ⊆ X is an ℵn-Suslin set iff P =
⋃
ξ<ℵn
Pξ with Pξ Borelians.
16 As the
wellordering < on R is Σ12, according to a theorem of Scho¨nfield, its
ordinal is < ℵ2 and CH is therefore valid.
In spite of its intrinsic limitations, L is a very interesting model
of ZFC, which possesses a “fine structure” interpolating between the
different Fα and very rich combinatorial properties investigated by
Jensen. One of its main properties is the following. Let us first define
what is a club (“closed unbounded” subset) C ⊆ α of a limit ordinal
α: C is closed for the order topology (i.e. limits in C belong to C:
if β < α and Sup (C ∩ β) = β, then β ∈ C) and unbounded in α
(for every β < α) there exists an element γ ∈ C s.t. β < γ . For
a cardinal κ, let κ be the property that there exists a sequence of
clubs Cα ⊆ α with α < κ
+ s.t. Cα is of order type ≤ κ (and < κ if
cf (α) < κ) and if λ is a limit point of Cα then Cα ∩ λ = Cλ. κ is
used to construct systematically and coherently bijections between κ
and ordinals κ ≤ α < κ+ by cofinalizing the α by clubs. We have:
Theorem (Jensen, 1970). V = L |= ∀κ κ. 
κ constrains the structure of the stationary subsets S of κ
+ (S ⊂
κ+ is stationary if S ∩ C 6= ∅ for every club C in κ+). These cannot
reflect at some ordinal α < κ of cf (α) > ω, where “reflect” means
“remaining stationary in α”.
One can generalize the concept of constructibility in two ways.17
First, if A is any set, one can relativize definability to A taking
DA(x) = {y ⊆ x | y definable by a first order formula of the structure
〈x,∈, {s|s ∈ A ∩ x}〉)}. One gets that way the universe, called L [A],
16See Moschovakis [1980], p. 97.
17See Kanamori [1994], p. 34.
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of constructible sets relative to A. In L [A] the only remaining part of
A is A ∩ L [A] ∈ L [A]. As L, L [A] satisfies AC and is ZF -absolute.
On the other hand, one can start the recursive construction of L not
with L0 = ∅ but with the transitive closure of {A}, L0 (A). One gets
that way L (A) which is the smallest inner model containing On and
A. If there is a wellordering on A (it the case if AC is valid), then
L (A) is globally wellordered for the same reasons as L. In particular,
L(R) is a good compromise between the non constructibility of R and
the constructibility from R of the rest of the universe.
In spite of its interest, the structure of L is rather pathological
with regards to the continuum and many of the above results are in
some sense counterintuitive. They result from the fact that the AC,
which implies the existence of very complicated and irregular sets,
remains valid in L and that the axiom of constructibility V = L forces
some of them to exist inside the projective hierarchy which should be
composed only of relatively simple and regular sets: nicely definable
sets are not necessarily well-behaved.
It is the reason why many specialists consider that the strategy
V = L is dramatically too restrictive and, moreover, that its restric-
tion to constructibility is not philosophically justifiable. For instance,
John Steel (2000) claims:
“The central idea of descriptive set theory is that definable
sets of reals are free from the pathologies one gets from a
wellorder of the reals. Since V = L implies there is a ∆12
wellorder of the reals, under V = L this central idea col-
lapses low in the projective hierarchy, and after that there
is, in an important sense, no descriptive set theory. One
has instead infinitary combinatorics on ℵ1. This is certainly
not the sort of theory that looks useful to Analysts.”
One could think that generalizations of constructibility such as
L (A) or L [A] would overcome the problem. But it is not the case.
6 The “maximalist” strategy of large
cardinals
It is therefore justified to reverse the strategy and to look for additional
axioms, which could be considered “natural”, for ZF and ZFC, and to
try to generalize to such augmented axiomatics the search of canonical
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models and fine combinatorial structures. As was emphasized by John
Steel (2004):
“In extending ZFC, we are attempting to maximize inter-
pretative power”.
And there is place for philosophy in such a maximizing strategy since
the problem is not only to find a solution to the continuum problem
but also to understand what “to be a solution” means. By the way,
to study such “maximizing” large cardinals models is perfectly com-
patible with a minimalist perspective: one has only to relativize the
theory to the constructible subuniverse L since ZFC + “V = L” ⊢ ϕ
is equivalent to ZFC ⊢ ϕL. As explained by Steel (2004), suppose
that the philosopher A believes in L and the philosopher B in L[G]
with G forcing the adjunction of ω2 reals to the model of R in L. A
believes in CH and B in ¬CH, but B can interpret the formulae ϕ of
A as its own ϕL and A can interpret the formulae ϕ of B as forced ϕ
(the truth of  ϕ being definable in the ground model L, see above).
There is therefore no real conflict.
Different “maximizing” strategies have been considered:
1. Iterate transfinitely theories Tα+1 = Tα+ “consistency of Tα”
starting from ZF or ZFC.
2. Postulate “good” regularity properties of projective sets, and
therefore of the continuum.
3. Make the theory of the continuum “rigid”, that is define under
which conditions the properties of R cannot be further modified
by forcing.
Strategy (3) tries to reduce – and even to neutralize – the variability
induced by forcing. The ideal aim would be forcing invariance to make
the theories of R and P(R) in some sense as “rigid” as first order
arithmetic. It is an extremely difficult program and we will first evoke
some classical results concerning R. CH concerns P(R) the forcing
invariance of which is the object of more recent works of Woodin. But
we first emphasize the fact that strategies (1), (2) converge towards
the introduction of large cardinal axioms (LCAs) which express the
existence of higher infinities. Indeed, it seems that every “maximizing”
strategy is in some sense equivalent to a LCA. Look for instance at the
Proper Forcing Axiom PFA. A forcing P is called proper if, for every
regular uncountable cardinal λ, it preserves the stationary subsets of
[λ]ω (the set of countable subsets of λ).
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Proper Forcing Axiom. If the forcing P is proper and if the
Dα’s are dense subsets indexed by the countable ordinals α < ω1,
then there exists a filter G ⊆ P intersecting all the Dα’s. (Compare
with the definition of G being generic). 
Many results are known for PFA. It implies 2ℵ0 = ℵ2 (and there-
fore ¬CH), it implies projective determinacy PD (Woodin) and AD
(Steel, 2007) for the inner model L (R).18 As far as its consistency
strength is concerned, it is known that
Con (∃κ supercompact)⇒ Con (PFA)⇒ Con (∃κ measurable) .
It is conjectured that in fact PFA is equiconsistant with “∃κ super-
compact” (see below for a definition of supercompacity).
It also seems that there exists a wellordering of LCAs which can be
defined by the inclusion of their sets of Σ12 (and even Π
0
1) consequences.
As emphasized by John Steel (2000):
“It seems that the consistency strengths of all natural ex-
tensions of ZFC are wellordered, and the large cardinal
hierarchy provides a sort of yardstick which enables us to
compare these consistency strengths.”
Philosophically speaking, the nominalist confusion between a strong
“quasi-ontology” for sets and a realist “true” ontology of abstract ide-
alities has disqualified such axioms. But I think that such a dogmatic
prejudice has been a great philosophical mistake. Indeed, I think that
one of the best philosophical formulation of incompleteness is pre-
cisely to say that a “good” theory of the continuum requires a very
strong “quasi-ontology” for sets, a maximal one, not a minimal one.
A “good” regularity of the continuum entails for objective reasons a
strong “platonist” commitment concerning higher infinities. This key
point has been perfectly emphasized by Patrick Dehornoy:
“properties which put into play objects as ‘small’ as sets
of reals (...) are related to other properties which put into
play very ‘huge’ objects which seem very far from them.”19
Some specialists call “reverse descriptive set theory” this remark-
able equivalence between properties of regularity of projective sets and
LCAs.
18See below §§ 7.2 and 8 for a definition of PD and AD.
19Dehornoy [1989].
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There are many theorems showing that the platonist “cost” of a
“good” theory is very high. Let us for instance mention one of the
first striking theorems proved by Robert Solovay using forcing. Let
CM be the axiom of existence of a measurable cardinal (see below for
a definition).
Solovay theorem (1969). ZFC + CM ⊢ every Σ12 is “regular”
(where “regular” means properties such as Baire property, Lebesgue
measurability, and perfect set property).20 
7 Regularity of projective sets
7.1 The regularity of analytic sets
The French school (Borel, Baire, Lebesgue) and the Russian and Pol-
ish schools (Suslin, Luzin, Sierpinski) initiated the study of the Borel
and projective classes and achieved deep results concerning their reg-
ularity and their representation where “regularity” means Lebesgue
measurability, or the perfect set property (to be countable or to con-
tain a perfect subset, i.e. a closed subset without isolated point), or
the Baire property (to be approximated by an open subset up to a
meager set, i.e. a countable union of nowhere dense sets).
The first regularity theorem is the celebrated:
Cantor-Bendixson theorem. If A ⊆ R is closed, then A can
be decomposed in a unique way as a disjoint union A = P + S where
P is perfect and S countable. 
As a perfect set P is of cardinality |P | = 2ℵ0 , the continuum hy-
pothesis CH holds for the closed sets Π01.
Another early great classical theorem of regularity is the:
Suslin theorem. The analytic subsets Σ11 shares the perfect sub-
set property and CH is therefore true for the Σ11 sets. 
In the same way, one can show that the Σ11 share the Baire prop-
erty and that the Σ11 and Π
1
1 are Lebesgue measurable. But it is
impossible to show in ZF that the ∆11 and Σ
1
2 share the perfect set
property and to show in ZFC that the ∆12 share the Baire property.
In fact many of the “natural” properties of the projective sets go far
beyond the demonstrative strength of ZF and ZFC. It is therefore
methodologically and philosophically justified to look for additional
axioms.
20See Moschovakis [1980], p. 284.
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7.2 Projective determinacy and the “regular-
ity” of the continuum
A very interesting regularity hypothesis is the so called determinacy
property. One considers infinite games on sets X. Each player (I and
II) plays in turn an element a of X:
I a0 a2 ...
ց ր ց ր
II a1 a3
At the end of the game we get a sequence f ∈ XN. Let A ⊂ XN. The
player I (resp. II) wins the play f of the game G = GX(A) associated
to A if f ∈ A (resp. if f /∈ A).
Definition. A is called determined (written Det(A) or DetGX(A))
if one player has a winning strategy. Therefore A is determined iff
∃a0∀a1∃a2...(a0, a1, a2, ...) ∈ A.
Determinacy is a strong property of “regularity”. Indeed, for every
A ⊂ R (R being identified with N = ωω), Det(A) ⇒“A satisfies the
Baire and the perfect subset properties, and is Lebesgue measurable”.
The first theorem linking determinacy with the projective hierar-
chy has been the key result:21
Gale-Stewart Theorem(1953). ZFC ⊢ closed subsets A of
XN (the Π01) are determined. 
After many efforts, Donald Martin proved a fundamental theorem
which concluded a first stage of the story:
Martin theorem (1975). ZFC ⊢ Borel sets (the ∆11) are deter-
mined. 
This celebrated result shows that ZFC is a “good” axiomatic for
the Borel subsets of R. But, it is the limit of what is provable in
ZFC. Indeed, ZFC cannot imply the determinacy of Σ11-sets since in
the constructible model L of ZFC there exist Σ11-sets that don’t share
the perfect set property. As for Π11-sets, their determinacy implies the
measurability of the Σ12-sets, but in L there exists a ∆
1
2-wellorder of R,
which, according to Fubini theorem, cannot be Lebesgue measurable.
21See Grigorieff [1976] and Moschovakis [1980], p. 288.
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8 The necessity of large cardinals and
“reverse” descriptive set theory
To prove determinacy results for projective sets beyond ∆11, one must
introduce additional axioms and many converging results show that
the most natural are large cardinal axioms. The first example was
introduced by Stan Ulam. If X is a set, a filter U over X is a set of
subsets of X, U ⊆ P(X), s.t. (i) ∅ /∈ U , (ii) if U ∈ U and U ⊆ V then
V ∈ U , (iii) if U, V ∈ U then U ∩ V ∈ U (i.e., the complementary set
of U in the Boolean algebra P(X) is an ideal). U is an ultrafilter if
it is maximal, namely if for every U ⊆ X, either U ∈ U or X − U ∈
U . For every x ∈ X, Ux = {U ⊆ X : x ∈ U} is an ultrafilter called
“principal”. A non principal ultrafilter is called “free”.
Definition. A cardinal χ > ω is measurable if it bears a free
ultrafilter U which is χ-complete (that is stable w.r.t. χ-infinite in-
tersections
⋂
λ<χ
Xλ with λ < χ). It is equivalent to say that χ bears a
measure µ with range {0, 1} (with µ(χ) = 1), diffuse (without atoms:
∀ξ ∈ χ we have µ({ξ}) = 0) and χ-additive. The equivalence is given
by µ(A) = 1 ⇔ A ∈ U and µ(A) = 0 ⇔ χ − A ∈ U and is analogous
to the opposition between finite and infinite subsets in ω. 
A first typical result was another theorem due to Donald Martin:
Martin theorem (1970). ZFC +MC ⊢ Det
(
Σ11
)
. 
Corollary: Solovay theorem (1969). ZFC +MC ⊢ “the Σ12-
sets are ‘regular’ ”. 
But Solovay also showed that ZFC+MC 0 PD (where PD is the
axiom of Projective Determinacy : every projective A ⊆ R is deter-
mined, see below) since ZFC+PD ⊢ Cons(ZFC+MC) and therefore
if ZFC+MC ⊢ PD we would have ZFC+MC ⊢ Cons(ZFC+MC),
which would contradict Go¨del theorem.
Scott theorem (1961). MC is false in V = L and therefore
ZFC 0 CM . 
The proof of Scott theorem uses the concept of an ultrapower V U
where U is an ultrafilter on a set S. The elements of V U are the
maps f : S → V , f and g being equivalent if they are equal almost
everywhere (a.e.), that is if {s ∈ S : f(s) = g(s)} ∈ U . Any element x
of V is represented by the constant map f(s) = x and this defines a
canonical embedding j : V →֒ V U . If ϕ (x1, . . . , xn) is a formula of the
language of V , ϕ (f1, . . . , fn) is valid in V
U
(
V U |= ϕ (f1, . . . , fn)
)
iff
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ϕ (f1, . . . , fn) is valid a.e., that is if
{s ∈ S : V |= ϕ (f1(s), . . . , fn(s))} ∈ U .
One shows that V U is well-founded if the ultrafilter U is ω1-complete
and that there exists an isomorphism between
〈
V U ,∈U
〉
and 〈MU ,∈〉
where MU is an inner model (Mostowski collapsing lemma). A funda-
mental theorem of  Losˇ says that j : V ≺MU is an elementary embed-
ding (see above for the definition). If j is an elementary embedding
j :M ≺M∗ of models of ZFC whereM∗ is an inner model of M and
if α ∈ On(M) is an ordinal in M , one has j(α) ∈ On(M∗) ⊂ On(M)
and, because of the elementarity of j, α < β ⇔ j(α) < j(β). This
implies j(α) ≥ α. One shows that there exists necessarily an ordinal
α s.t. j(α) > α. Let χ be the smallest of these α. It is called the
critical ordinal crit(j) of j.
Theorem. If the free ultrafilter U on the measurable cardinal χ
is χ-complete, then crit(j) = χ and therefore j (χ) > χ. 
Corollary: Scott theorem. 
Indeed, suppose there exists a MC and let χ be the least MC.
Now suppose that V = L. Elementarity implies MU = L since MU is
an inner model satisfying the axiom of constructibility and therefore
L ⊆ MU ⊆ V = L. Then in MU = L = V , j (χ) is the least MC,
which contradicts j (χ) > χ. 
Measurable cardinals χ are very large; such a χ is regular (there
exists no unbounded f : λ → χ with λ < χ), strongly inaccessible
(∀λ < χ, 2λ < χ), and preceded by χ strongly inaccessible smaller
cardinals. But as large as they may be, MCs guarantee only the
determinacy of the lowest post-Borelian level of definable subsets of
R. To guarantee the determinacy of all projective subsets, one needs
much stronger axioms, such as PD, which are not entailed by MC
(see Solovay’s remark above)
As we will see below, many specialists consider that Projective
Determinacy is a “good” axiomatic for R. Indeed, PD is “empiri-
cally complete” for the projective sets and ZFC+PD “rigidifies” the
properties of projective sets w.r.t. forcing: it makes them “forcing-
absolute” or “generically absolute”. One can also consider the even
stronger axiom (Woodin axiom) “L(R) satisfies AD” where L(R) is
the constructible closure of R (i.e. the smallest inner model containing
On and R, see above) and the Axiom of Determinacy AD means that
every subset of R is determined. AD is incompatible with AC since,
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according to Fubini theorem, AC enables to construct non-Lebesgue
measurable, and therefore non-determined, subsets of R.
9 The transcendance of R over L and
the set 0# (0 sharp)
9.1 Indiscernible ordinals
Once we accept the relevance and the legitimacy of LCAs, we need
some tools for measuring the transcendence of V over L. A first pos-
sibility is given by what are called indiscernible ordinals (Silver, 1966)
which enable to construct the simplest canonical non constructible
real. We consider the levels of L of the form 〈Lλ,∈〉 with λ a limit
ordinal. A set I of ordinals in this cumulative hierarchy Lλ of con-
structive sets up to level λ is called a set of indiscernibles if, for every
n-ary formula ϕ (x1, . . . , xn), the validity of ϕ on I is independent of
the choice of the xi’s: that is for every sequences c1 < . . . < cn and
d1 < . . . < dn in I
Lλ |= ϕ (c1, . . . , cn) iff Lλ |= ϕ (d1, . . . , dn) .
When it exists, the set S of Silver indiscernibles is characterized
by the following properties, which express that, for all uncountable
cardinals κ, all the Lκ’s share essentially the same first-order structure:
1. κ ∈ S (all uncountable cardinals of V are indiscernible in L).
2. S ∩ κ is of order-type κ.
3. S ∩ κ is closed and unbounded (club, see above) in κ if κ is
regular.
4. S ∩ κ is a set of indiscernibles for 〈Lκ,∈〉.
5. The Skolem hull of S ∩ κ in Lκ is equal to Lκ: Hull
Lκ (S ∩ κ) =
Lκ, where the Skolem hull of I ⊂ Lκ is constructed by adding for
every (n+ 1)-ary formula ϕ (y, x1, . . . , xn) with xi ∈ I a Skolem
term tϕ (x1, . . . , xn) which is the smallest y (for the wellorder of
L) s.t. ϕ (y, x1, . . . , xn) if such an y exists and 0 otherwise. In
other words every constructible element a ∈ Lκ is definable by a
definite description with parameters in the indiscernibles S ∩ κ.
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This can be generalized to structures M = 〈M,E〉 with a binary
relation E looking like ∈, that is, which are elementary equivalent
to some 〈Lλ,∈〉 for λ a limit ordinal and I ⊂ M . In that case, we
have HullM (I) ≺M and in fact HullM (I) is the smallest elementary
substructure of M containing I. Let Σ = Σ (M, I) be the set of
formulae ϕ which can be satisfied by M on I. This defines particular
sets of formulae called EM -sets (from Ehrenfeucht-Mostowski, 1956).
The EM theorem says that if Σ is a theory having infinite models
and if 〈I,<〉 is any total well-ordering of infinite order-type α ≥ ω,
then there exists a model M of Σ containing I for which I is a set of
indiscernibles, and moreover, M can be chosen in such a way as to be
the Skolem hull of I: M = HullM (I). Such an (M, I) is essentially
unique and its transitive collapse (isomorphism with a structure where
E becomes ∈) is written (M (Σ, α) , I (Σ, α)) where α is the order type
of I (I (Σ, α) is therefore a set of true ∈-ordinals).
One can develop a theory of EM -sets and of their well-foundedness.
If Σ is well-founded (i.e. if M (Σ, α) is well-founded for every ordi-
nal α) and if α is a limit ordinal, then M (Σ, α) is isomorphic to a
〈Lλ,∈〉. Moreover, if I (Σ, κ), with κ > ω an uncountable cardinal, is
unbounded in the class of ordinals ofM (Σ, α) (and it is then the case
for every ordinal α > ω), and if for every ordinal γ < iω (the ω-th
element of I (Σ, κ)) we have γ ∈ HullM ({in}) (and it is then the case
for every ordinal α > ω), then M (Σ, κ) = 〈Lκ,∈〉, I (Σ, κ) is closed
unbounded in κ and if τ > κ > ω then I (Σ, τ) ∩ κ = I (Σ, κ) .
Let us return to Silver indiscernibles. If such a Σ exists, S is
defined by
S =
⋃
{I (Σ, κ) : κ uncountable cardinal} .
The uniqueness of S is a consequence of the unicity of such a Σ:
Theorem. Such a Σ is unique and is the set of n-ary sentences
ϕ s.t. Lℵω |= ϕ (ℵ1, . . . ,ℵn). It is called “zero sharp” and written 0
#
(see below). 
If there exists an uncountable limit cardinal κ s.t. 〈Lκ,∈〉 possesses
an uncountable set I of indiscernibles, then S exists. The existence of
S is also implied by large cardinal hypothesis as for instance:
Theorem. If there exists a MC then S exists and moreover Lκ ≺
Lλ for every uncountable κ < λ. 
The existence of S under MC means that after the first uncount-
able level Lℵ1 all the Lκ share essentially the same first-order theory. V
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transcends L, but in such a way that it makes L as simple as possible,
Lℵ1 = Hull
Lℵ1 (S ∩ ℵ1) determining the theory of L.
A deep consequence is that the truth in L becomes definable in V .
Indeed, let ϕ (x1, . . . , xn) be a formula. There exists an uncountable
cardinal κ s.t.
for all (xi) ∈ Lκ, L |= ϕ (xi) iff Lκ |= ϕ (xi) .
As Lκ ≺ Lλ if κ < λ, we have
L |= ϕ (xi) iff Lλ |= ϕ (xi) for all λ ≥ κ .
Now, we arithmetize the situation. Let T = {pϕq : Lℵ1 |= ϕ} be the
set of Go¨del numbers of the ϕ valid in Lℵ1 and therefore in all the Lκ
(κ uncountable) by elementarity. Then
L |= ϕ iff pϕq ∈ T
defines the truth in L. This is not in contradiction with Go¨del-Tarski
uncompleteness theorems since ℵ1 and T are not definable in L and
therefore the truth of L is not definable in L.
9.2 The set 0#
As Lℵω ≺ L and ℵi ∈ S for i > 0 in ω, we can represent the indis-
cernibles in formulae by some of the ℵi’s and restrict to Lℵω , which
contains all the ℵi’s. Then, L |= ϕ (xi) for xi ∈ S iff Lℵω |= ϕ (ℵi).
Solovay called 0# (zero sharp) the set (if it exists) defined by
0# = {ϕ : Lℵω |= ϕ (ℵi)}
which is the set of formulae true on the indiscernibles of L. Via
Go¨delization 0# becomes a set of integers (also written 0#) and can
therefore be coded by a real (also written 0#).
We must emphasize the fact that, as Lℵ1 ≺ L, every constructible
set x ∈ L which is definable in L is countable since its definite descrip-
tion is valid in Lℵ1 by elementarity and therefore x ∈ Lℵ1 . More gen-
erally for every infinite constructible set x ∈ L we have |P(x)|L = |x|.
Since the existence of a measurable cardinal implies that 0# exists,
we have:
Corollary. If there exists a MC, the constructible continuum RL
is countable. 
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Via arithmetization through Go¨del numbers, the non constructible
set 0# can be considered as a very special subset /∈ L of ω = N or as
a very special real number coding the truth in L. Its existence implies
that every uncountable cardinal κ of V is an indiscernible of L and
shares all large cardinal axioms verified by L.
A property equivalent to the existence of 0# is the non rigidity of
L:
Theorem (Kunen). 0# exists iff there exists a non trivial ele-
mentary embedding j : L ≺ L (this presuppose V 6= L and j non
trivial, see below). 
Indeed, as HullL(S) = L, for every x ∈ L there exists a Skolem
term t s.t. x = t (iα1 , . . . , iαn), iα being the α-th element of S. j is
then simply defined by the shift on indiscernibles
j(x) = j (t (iα1 , . . . , iαn)) = t (iα1+1, . . . , iαn+1) .
One shows that it is an elementary embedding and, as j (i0) = i1 6= i0,
j is non trivial. 
By the way, this proves again that V 6= L since another theorem
of Kunen proves that
ZFC ⊢ there exists no j : V ≺ V .
The existence of 0# is a principle of transcendence of V over
L expressing that V is very different from L. If 0# doesn’t exist,
then V looks like L (L is a good approximation of V ) according to the
result:
Covering lemma (Jansen). If 0# doesn’t exist, then if x is an
uncountable set of ordinals there exists a constructible set y ⊇ x of
the same cardinality as x. So, every set x of ordinals can be covered
by a constructible set y ⊇ x of cardinality |y| = |x| .ℵ1. 
Corollary. If 0# doesn’t exist, the covering lemma implies that,
for every limit singular cardinal κ of V , we have (κ+)
L
= κ+, which
shows that V and L are quite similar. 
Indeed (see Jech [1978], p. 358), if λ = (κ+)
L
and if λ < κ+,
then |λ| = κ . But as κ is singular, we would have cf (λ) < |λ| and
this is impossible since λ is regular in L and λ ≥ ω2. For, if x is
an unbounded subset of λ of cardinal |x| = cf (λ) , it can be covered
by a constructible subset y ∈ L of λ of cardinal |y| = |x| .ℵ1 and,
as λ is regular in L, |y| = |λ|. So, |λ| = ℵ1. cf (λ) and, as λ ≥ ω2,
|λ| = cf (λ). 
27
Corollary. If GCH fails at a strong limit singular cardinal, then
0# exists. 
Indeed, if 0# doesn’t exist, for such a singular cardinal κ we have
(κ+)
L
= κ+. As L satisfies GCH , (2κ)L = (κ+)
L
= κ+.22 Now,
κ is a strong limit by hypothesis (i.e. λ < κ ⇒ 2λ < κ) and this
implies κcf(κ) = 2κ and moreover, since κ is singular and therefore
cf (κ) < |κ|, 2cf(κ) < κ. Let x ∈ A = [κ]cf(κ) be a subset of κ of
cardinal cf (κ). It is covered by a constructible subset y ∈ L of κ of
cardinal |y| = λ = ℵ1. cf (κ). Then A can be covered by the union of
the [y]cf(κ) for such Y . But
∣∣∣[y]cf(κ)∣∣∣ = λcf(κ) = (ℵ1. cf (κ))cf(κ) = 2cf(κ),
and by hypothesis 2cf(κ) < κ. Now, there exist at most |D (κ)| such
y 23 and |D (κ)| = (κ+)
L
= κ+. All this implies |A| = κcf(κ) = κ+. As
κcf(κ) = 2κ, we have 2κ = κ+, that is GCH. 
There are many ways for insuring that 0# exists, for instance PFA
since PFA implies the failure of κ for every κ (Todorcevic, 1980).
More generally, many results show that a failure of κ is linked with
LCAs. For instance:
• Jensen: if κ fails for some singular κ, there exists an inner
model M with a strong cardinal.
• Solovay: if κ is supercompact, then λ fails for every λ > κ.
This is related to the fact that properties such as the covering between
V and M allow to reflect κ from M to V and therefore, if κ fails
in V for κ singular it is because there exist some LCs violating the
covering lemma.
When 0# exists, a very interesting structure to look at is L
[
0#
]
.
It can be shown 24 that L
[
0#
]
has a fine structure, satisfies the
Global Square property ∀κ κ and, for every singular cardinal κ of
V , (κ+)
L[0#] = κ+. Iterating the sharp operation, one can get an in-
creasing sequence of modelsM mildly transcendent over L which have
also a fine structure, satisfy the Global Square property and, for every
singular cardinal κ of V , (κ+)
M
= κ+, and are smaller than the first
inner model possessing a measurable cardinal. Under the hypothesis
that a# exists for every set of ordinals a (a# is defined as 0# but
22As, if 0# exists, (2κ)
L
= κ for every infinite cardinal since κ+ is inaccessible in L,
(2κ)L = κ+ > κ is a counter exemple when 0# doesn’t exist.
23Recall that D(x) is the set of constructible parts of x (see above).
24See e.g. Steel [2001].
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in L[a]), one can even go beyond this limit, up to the existence of a
supercompact cardinal.
9.3 0# and the hierarchical structure of V be-
yond L.
The equivalence between the existence of 0# and the existence of a non
trivial elementary embedding j : L ≺ L enables to clarify the structure
of V beyond L 25. Let κ = crit (j) and let U be the set of subsets u ⊆ κ
s.t. u ∈ L (i.e. u ∈ L∩P (κ)) and κ ∈ j (u). U is trivially a filter. It is
an ultrafilter since for every u ∈ L∩P (κ) either κ ∈ j (u) or κ /∈ j (u).
It is a free ultrafilter since if u ⊂ κ is bounded, then κ /∈ u, j (u) = u,
κ /∈ j (u) and therefore u /∈ U . Moreover, it is κ-complete w.r.t. L
since if uα ∈ U ∩ L is a family with α < β < κ then
⋂
α<β uα ∈ U .
One can show that the ultrapower LU is well-founded. Due to  Losˇ
theorem, the embedding i : L ≺ LU is elementary. But the Mostowski
collapsing lemma implies that
〈
LU ,∈U
〉
≃ 〈MU ,∈〉 for some transitive
inner model MU . But necessarily MU = L by minimality of L and
via this isomorphism i : L ≺ LU becomes an elementary embedding
j : L ≺ L. It can be shown that, if λ = (κ+)L then M = 〈Lλ,∈,U〉
is a model of ZF−{Power Set axiom} where κ becomes the largest
cardinal, U remains a free ultrafilter κ-complete with “good” technical
properties (“normality” and “amenability”). Such a procedure can be
iterated on the ordinals. Starting from a M0 = 〈Lλ0 ,∈,U0〉, one gets
a M1 = 〈Lλ1 ,∈,U1〉, etc. The successive Mα yield a sequence of
critical cardinals κα which are indiscernibles for L.
10 Determination and reflection phe-
nomena
To measure the size of large cardinals, the best way is to use associated
reflection phenomena which are of a very deep philosophcal value.26
Intuitively, reflection means that the properties of the whole universe
V are reflected in sub-universes. As was emphasized by Matthew
Foreman (1998, p. 6):
25See e.g. Schimmerling [2001].
26See Martin-Steel [1989], Patrick Dehornoy [1989].
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“Any property that holds in the mathematical universe
should hold of many set-approximations of the mathemat-
ical universe.”
Definition. A cardinal χ reflects a relation Φ(x, y) defined on
ordinals if every solution y ≥ χ parametrized by x < χ can be substi-
tuted for by a solution y < χ:
∀α(∈ On) < χ [∃β ≥ χ Φ(α, β)⇒ ∃β∗ < χ Φ(α, β∗)] .
Let j be an elementary embedding j : M ≺ M∗. χ = crit (j)
is a large – in fact at least measurable – cardinal, which increases
indefinitely when M∗ moves near to M , the limit M∗ = M being
inconsistent according to Kunen theorem.
To see that it is a reflection phenomenon, let Φ(α, χ) be a relation
that holds in M for α < χ. IfM∗ is sufficiently close to M for Φ(α, χ)
to remain true in M∗, then M∗ |= ∃(x < j(χ))Φ(α, x) (it is sufficient
to take x = χ). But, according to the elementarity of the embedding
j, this is equivalent to M |= ∃(x < χ)Φ(α, x).
To go beyond measurable cardinals, specialists use the following
technique. Let Vα be the cumulative hierarchy of sets up to level α.
For χ critical (and therefore measurable), one has VM
∗
χ = V
M
χ (that
is the equality of M and M∗ up to level χ).
Definition. The cardinal χ is called superstrong in M if there
exists an elementary embedding j s.t. V M
∗
j(χ) = V
M
j(χ) (that is V
M∗
j(χ) ⊂M
and M =M∗ up to j(χ) and not only up to χ ). 
Between measurable and superstrong cardinals, Hugh Woodin in-
troduced another class of large cardinals.
Definition. A cardinal δ is called a Woodin cardinal if for every
map F : δ → δ, there exists κ < δ and an elementary embedding j
of critical ordinal κ s.t. F |κ : κ → κ and V
M∗
j(F (κ)) = V
M
j(F (κ)) (that is
M =M∗ up to j(F (κ)) ). 
Woodin has shown that:
1. if δ is a Woodin cardinal, there exist infinitely many smaller
measurable cardinals χ < δ,
2. if λ is a superstrong cardinal, there exist infinetely many smaller
Woodin cardinals δ < λ.
A key result is the Martin-Steel theorem which evaluates exactly
the “cost” of determinacy:
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Martin-Steel theorem (1985). If there exist n Woodin cardi-
nals δi, i = 1, . . . , n, dominated by a measurable cardinal κ (κ > δi
for all i), then ZFC ⊢ Det
(
Π1n+1
)
. 
The converse is due to Woodin.
Corollary. If there exists a countable infinity of Woodin cardinals
dominated by a measurable cardinal, in particular if there exists a
superstrong cardinal λ, then Projective Determinacy is valid (all the
projective subsets of R are determined). 
Projective Determinacy is also valid under PFA (Woodin, see
above).
It is for this reason that specialists consider that ZFC+ Projective
Determinacy is a “good” axiomatic for R. We must also emphasize
the:
Martin-Steel-Woodin theorem (1987). If there exists a count-
able infinity of Woodin cardinals dominated by a measurable cardinal,
in particular if there exists a superstrong cardinal λ, then L(R) (the
smallest inner model of V containing the ordinals On and R, see
above) satisfies the axiom of complete determinacy AD: every A ⊆ R
is determined. (This result is stronger than the previous one since
P(R) ∩ L(R) is a larger class than the projective class.) 
AD is incompatible with AC since AC enables the construction of
a non determined well ordering on R (see above).27
But the most significative results concern perhaps the situation
where no property of R could be further modified in a forcing ex-
tension. In that case, the theory of the continuum becomes “rigid”.
Woodin and Shelah have shown that it is possible to approximate
this ideal goal if there exists a supercompact cardinal κ. κ is γ-
supercompact if there exists an elementary embedding j : V ≺ M
s.t. crit(j) = κ, γ < j(κ) and Mγ ⊆ M . κ is supercompact if it is
γ-supercompact for every γ ≥ κ (κ is κ-supercompact iff it is measur-
able).28 Such a deep result clarifies the nature of the axioms which are
needed for a “good” theory of the continuum.
11 Woodin’s Ω-logic
Large cardinal axioms (LCAs) can decide some properties of regular-
ity of R, but they cannot settle CH since a “small” forcing (adding
27So, the inner model L(R) of a ZFC–model V can violate AC.
28See Dehornoy [2003].
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ℵ2 new subsets to ω) is sufficient to force ¬CH from a CH-model and
such a small forcing remains possible irrespective of what LCAs are
introduced (Levy-Solovay theorem). We need therefore a new strat-
egy. As we have just seen, the most natural one is to try to make the
properties of the continuum immune relatively to forcing, that is to
make the continuum in some sense “rigid”. The deepest contempo-
rary results in this perspective are provided byWoodin’s extraordinary
recent works on Ω-logic and the negation of CH.
We look for theories sharing some absoluteness properties relatively
to forcing. This is called “conditional generic absoluteness”.29
The fragment of V where CH “lives” naturally is (H2,∈) where
(Hk,∈) is the set of sets x which are hereditary of cardinal |x| < ℵk.
The fragment (H0,∈) = Vω is the set of hereditary finite sets and, with
the axioms ZF minus the axiom of infinity, is equivalent to first order
arithmetic 〈ω = N,+, .,∈〉 with Peano axioms. In one direction, N can
be retrieved from H0 using von Neumann’s construction of ordinals
and, conversely, H0 can be retrieved from N via Ackermann’s trick: if
p, q are integers, p ∈ q iff the p-th digit in the binary extension of q
is 1. For first order arithmetic, Peano axioms are “empirically” and
practically complete in spite of Go¨del incompleteness theorem. The
following classical result expresses their “rigidity”:
Scho¨nfield theorem.H0 is absolute and a fortiori forcing-invariant.
Incompleteness cannot be manifested in it using forcing. 
We can therefore consider ZFC as a “good” theory for first order
arithmetic. But it is no longer the case for larger fragments of V .
The fragment (H1,∈) of V composed of countable sets of finite
ordinals is isomorphic to 〈P (ω) = R, ω,+, .,∈〉 and corresponds to
second order arithmetic (i.e. analysis). The definable subsets A ⊆
P (ω) are the projective subsets 30 and therefore H1 can be considered
as the fragment of V where the projective sets live. We have seen that
to settle and “freeze” most of its higher order properties (regularity of
projective sets) w.r.t. forcing, we need LCAs and in particular PD.
As is emphasized by Woodin (2003, quoted in Dehornoy [2003]):
“Projective Determinacy settles (in the context of ZFC)
the classical questions concerning the projective sets and
29See Steel [2004]: “Generic absoluteness and the continuum problem”.
30A ⊆ P (ω) is definable in H1 (with parameters in H1) iff there exists a first-order
formula ϕ(x, y) and a parameter b ∈ P (ω) s.t. A = {a ∈ P (ω) |H1 |= ϕ(a, b)}. If π :
P (ω)→ [0, 1] ≃ R is given by π(a) =
∑
i∈a
1
2i
, then X ⊆ [0, 1] is projective iff A = π−1(X)
is definable in H1.
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moreover Cohen’s method of forcing cannot be used to es-
tablish that questions of second order number theory are
formally unsolvable from this axiom. (...) I believe the ax-
iom of Projective Determinacy is as true as the axioms of
Number Theory. So I suppose that I advocate a position
that might best be described as Conditional Platonism.”
We have also seen that under the LCA “there exists a proper
class of Woodin cardinals” (PCW : for every cardinal κ there exists a
Woodin cardinal > κ) we have:
Theorem (Woodin, 1984). ZFC + PCW ⊢ H1 is immune rel-
atively to forcing in the sense its properties are forcing-invariant. 
As PCW implies at the same time PD and forcing-invariance for
H1, it can be considered as a “good” theory, “empirically” and “prac-
tically” complete (marginalizing incompleteness) for (H1,∈), that is
for analysis (second order arithmetic). PCW implies the generic com-
pleteness result that all the L[R] of generic extensions V [G] are ele-
mentary equivalent.
The idea is then to try to generalize these types of absoluteness
properties relative to forcing. The general strategy for deciding that
way ZFC-undecidable properties ϕ in a fragment H of V is described
in the following way by Patrick Dehornoy (2003):
“every axiomatization freezing the properties of H rela-
tively to forcing (i.e. neutralizing forcing at the level H)
implies ϕ”.
The main problem tackled by Woodin was to apply this strategy
to the fragment (H2,∈) of V which is associated to the set P (ω1)
of countable ordinals. P (ω1) is not P (R) if ¬CH is satisfied, but
nevertheless it is possible to code CH by an H2-formula ϕCH s.t.
H2 |= ϕCH is equivalent to CH.
31 The problem with H2 is that
“small” forcings preserve LCAs 32 and in particular (Levy-Solovay
theorem, 1967) a small forcing of cardinal ℵ2 that enables to violate
CH by adding ℵ2 subsets to N preserves LCAs. Therefore H2 cannot
31The point is rather technical. Woodin has shown that if ¬CH is valid (i.e. R > ω1),
P(R) /∈ H2 and is already too big for freezing (neutralizing the effects of forcing) the
fragments of V containing it.
32Large cardinal axioms are axioms of the form A = ∃κψ(κ) which share the property
that if V  A then the cardinal κ is inaccessible and ψ(κ) is forcing-invariant for every
forcing extension V [G] of forcing cardinal < κ (“small” forcings).
33
be rigidified by LCAs.33 Whatever the large cardinal hypothesis A
may be, there will be always generic extensions M and N of V both
satisfying A such that M |= CH and N |= ¬CH. As CH is equivalent
to a Σ12 formula, M and N cannot be elementary equivalent from the
Σ12 level.
Woodin’s fundamental idea to overcome the dramatic difficulties of
the problem at the H2 level was to strengthen logic by restricting the
admissible models and constructing a new logic adapted to forcing-
invariance or “generic invariance”. As he explains in his key paper
on “The continuum hypothesis” (2001, p. 682):
“As a consequence (of generic invariance), any axioms we
find will yield theories for 〈H [ω2] ,∈〉 , whose ‘complete-
ness’ is immune to attack by applications of Cohen’s method
of forcing, just as it is the case for number theory.”
In a first step, he introduced the notion of Ω-validity |=Ω also called
in a first time Ω∗-derivability ⊢Ω∗ .
Definition. T being a theory in ZFC, we have T |=Ω ϕ iff ϕ
is valid in every generic extension where T is valid, that is iff for
every generic extension V [G] and every level α, (Vα)
V [G] |= T implies
(Vα)
V [G] |= ϕ. 
Of course |= implies |=Ω. But the converse is trivially false: there
exists Ω-valid formulae which are undecidable in ZFC, for instance
Con (ZFC). Indeed, if (Vα)
V [G] |= ZFC then (Vα)
V [G] is a model of
ZFC and (Vα)
V [G] |= Con (ZFC) So, ZFC |=Ω Con (ZFC), but of
course (Go¨del) ZFC 2 Con (ZFC).
It must be emphasized that Ω-validity doesn’t satisfy the compacity
property: there exist theories T and formulae ϕ s.t. we have T |=Ω ϕ
even if for every finite subset S ⊂ T we have S 2Ω ϕ.34
By construction, Ω-validity |=Ω is itself forcing-invariant:
35
Theorem (ZFC + PCW ). If V |= “T |=Ω ϕ” then V [G] |=
“T |=Ω ϕ” for every generic extension of V . 
Woodin investigated deeply this new “strong logic”. In particular
he was able to show that, under suitable LCAs, CH “rigidifies” V at
the Σ21-level (Σ1 formulae for Vω+2):
Theorem (Woodin, 1984). Under PCWmeas (there exists a
proper class of measurable Woodin cardinals) and CH, Ω-logic is
33See Dehornoy (2003).
34See Bagaria et al. [2005].
35See Woodin [2004].
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generically complete at the Σ21-level: for every ϕ of complexity Σ
2
1
either ZFC + CH |=Ω ϕ or ZFC + CH |=Ω ¬ϕ. All generic exten-
sionsM and N of V satisfying both CH are Σ21 elementary equivalent.

The metamathematical meaning of this result of conditional generic
absoluteness is that if a problem is expressed by a Σ21-formula ϕ then it
is “settled by CH” and immunized against forcing under appropriate
LCAs. But:
Theorem (Abraham, Shelah). This is false at the Σ22 level. For
every large cardinal hypothesis A there exist generic extensions M
and N satisfying both CH s.t. in M there exist a Σ22-wellorder of R
while in N all the Σ22-subsets of R are Lebesgue measurable. 
In a second step, Woodin interpreted the Ω-validity T |=Ω ϕ as the
semantic validity for an Ω-logic whose syntactic derivation T ⊢Ω ϕ had
to be defined. His idea was to witness the Ω-proofs by particular sets
that, under PCW , generalize the projective sets and can be inter-
preted without ambiguity in every generic extension. It is the most
difficult part of his work, not only at the technical level but also at
the philosophical level. The definition (under PCW ) is the following:
Definition (PCW ). T ⊢Ω ϕ iff there exists a universally Baire
(UB) set A ⊆ R s.t. for every A-closed countable transitive model
(ctm) M of T we have M |= ϕ (in other words M |= “T |=Ω ϕ”). 
A ⊆ R is UB if for every continuous map f : K → R with source
K compact Hausdorff, f−1 (A) has the Baire property (there exists
an open set U s.t. the symetric difference f−1 (A)∆U is meager). If
A ⊆ R is UB it is interpreted canonically in every generic extension
V [G] as AG ⊆ RV [G]. This is due to the fact that there exists a tree
presentation of A. One identifies R with ωω and one considers trees
T ⊂ (ω × γ)ω and the projections p[T ] on ωω of their infinite branches:
p[T ] = {x ∈ ωω | ∃z ∈ γω with (x |n, z |n) ∈ T,∀n ∈ ω} .
A ⊆ R is UB iff there exist trees T and S s.t. p[T ] = A and
p[S] = ωω−A in every generic extension V [G]. p[T ] yields a canonical
interpretation of A in every generic extension V [G]. A ctm M is called
A-closed if, for every ctm N ⊇M , A∩N ∈ N , in particular for every
generic extension V [G] and N =M [G] we have A ∩M [G] ∈M [G]. If
A is Borelian, every ctm is always A-closed.36 But it is no longer the
case for general UB sets.
36If M is A-closed for every A of Π11-complexity, then M is well-founded.
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As far as, in the definition of T ⊢Ω ϕ, the class of admissible models
is restricted to A-closed ctms, logic becomes strengthened. Of course,
T ⊢ ϕ implies T ⊢Ω ϕ, but the converse is false for the same reasons
as for Ω. Indeed, ZFC ⊢Ω Con (ZFC) because every suitable ctm
provides a model of ZFC and validates therefore Con (ZFC).
More technically, what is really needed for the definition T ⊢Ω ϕ
are UB sets A ⊆ R sharing the following two properties:
1. L (A,R)  AD+, where AD+ is a strengthening of the axiom
of determinacy saying that not only all A ⊆ R ≃ ωω are deter-
mined, but also all the π−1 (A) for all maps π : λω → ωω with
an ordinal λ < c+;
2. every A ⊂ P (R) ∩ L (A,R) is UB.37
PCW implies these two properties and is therefore a good hypothesis.
It must be emphasized that this definition of Ω-provability is very
original. As explain Joan Bagaria, Neus Castells and Paul Larson in
their “Ω-logic primer”:
“The notion of Ω-provability differs from the usual notions
of provability, e.g., in first-order logic, in that there is no
deductive calculus involved. In Ω-logic, the same UB set
may witness the Ω-provability of different sentences. For
instance, all tautologies have the same proof in Ω-logic,
namely ∅. In spite of this, it is possible to define a notion
of height of proof in Ω-logic.”
As Patrick Dehornoy explained to me (private communication), in Ω-
logic a proof ⊢Ω ϕ is a certificate of some property of the formula
ϕ. This witnessing is no longer a derivation iterating syntactic rules
but a UB subset of R. What is common to classical and Ω-logics is
that a very “small” object endowed with a precise internal structure
warrants the validity of ϕ in a lot of immensely large models.
Woodin proved that Ω-logic is sound : if T ⊢Ω ϕ then T |=Ω ϕ, i.e.
(under PCW ) if ⊢Ω ϕ then |= ϕ in all ZFC-models (Vα)
V [G]. He then
formulated the main conjecture:
Ω-conjecture (1999). Ω-logic is complete: if |=Ω ϕ then ⊢Ω ϕ.
As he emphasized in Woodin (2002, p. 517):
37See Woodin [2000].
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“If the Ω-conjecture is true, then generic absoluteness is
equivalent to absoluteness in Ω-logic and this in turn has
significant metamathematical implications”.
Indeed (Dehornoy, 2007), the Ω-conjecture means that any formula ϕ
valid in a lot of immensely large models satisfying LCAs are certified
by UB subsets of R. The key fact proved by Woodin is the link of
the concept of Ω-derivability with the existence of canonical models
for LCAs (that is models which are in a certain way minimal and
universal, as L for ZFC+CH). The Ω-conjecture expresses essentially
the hypothesis that every LCA admits a canonical model.
Theorem. ⊢Ω ϕ iff ZFC + A ⊢ ϕ for every large cardinal axiom
A admitting a canonical model. 
Now, the key point is that when H2 is rigidified, CH becomes
automatically false.
“If the theory of the structure 〈P (ω1) , ω1,+, .,∈〉 is to be
resolved on the basis of a good axiom then necessarily CH
is false.”
The idea is that if the theory T of P (ω1) is completely unambiguous in
the sense that there exists an axiom A s.t. T |= ϕ iff A |=Ω “T |= ϕ”,
then CH is necessarily false since the theory of P (R) cannot share
this property.
Woodin theorem (2000, under PCW ). (i) For every “solution”
for H2 (that is axioms freezing the properties of H2 w.r.t. forcing)
based on an Ω-complete axiom A (i.e. for every ϕ ∈ H2, either ZFC+
A ⊢Ω “ (H2,∈) |= ϕ” or ZFC + A ⊢Ω “ (H2,∈) |= ¬ϕ”), CH is false.
(ii) If the Ω-conjecture is valid, every “solution” for H2 is based on
an Ω-complete axiom and therefore CH is false. 
The proof uses Tarski results on the impossibility of defining truth
and is quite interesting (Woodin 2001, p. 688). Let
Γ = {pϕq : ZFC +A ⊢Ω “ (H2,∈) |= ϕ”}
be the (extremely complicated) set of Go¨del numbers of the sentences
Ω-valid in H2. By hypothesis, Γ is Ω-recursive in the sense there exists
a UB set B s.t. Γ is definable and recursive in L (B,R). Now, PCW
implies that Γ being Ω-recursive, it is definable in (H (c+) ,∈). If CH
would be valid, then c = ω1, H (c
+) = H2 and Γ would be definable
in H2, which would violate Tarski theorem.
It is in that sense Woodin (2001, p. 690) can claim:
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“Thus, I now believe the Continuum Hypothesis is solvable,
which is a fundamental change in my view of set theory”.
12 Conclusion
Hugh Woodin has already proved a great part of the Ω-conjecture.
Other approaches to the continuum problem in the set theoreti-
cal framework of LCAs have been proposed. One of the most inter-
esting alternative is provided by Matthew Foreman’s (2003) concept
of generic large cardinal (GLC) defined by elementary embeddings
j : V ≺ M of V in inner models M not of V itself but of generic
extensions V [G] of V . Such generic LCAs can support rather CH
than ¬CH.
But all these results show what are the difficulties met in elabo-
rating a “good” set theoretical determination of the continuum. The
old Kantian opposition between “conceptual” (symbolic) and “intu-
itive”, or, in Feferman’s terms, between “determined” and “inherently
vague”, remains insuperable. They justify some sort of Go¨del’s platon-
ism comprising additional axioms as some kind of “physical hypothe-
ses”. The nominalist antiplatonist philosophy of mathematics criti-
cizing such axioms (in particular LCAs) as ontological naive beliefs
must be reconsidered and substituted for a “conditional” platonism
in Woodin’s sense, a platonism which would be “conditional” to ax-
ioms which “rigidify” the continuum and make its properties forcing-
invariant.
In my 1991, 1992 and 1995 papers on the continuum problem, I in-
troduced the concept of “transcendental platonism”. Classical platon-
ism is a na¨ıve realist thesis on the ontological independence of mathe-
matical idealities, and as such is always dialectically opposed to anti-
platonist nominalism. Even to day, the debates concerning the status
of mathematical idealities remain trapped into the realist/nominalist
dialectic.38 The main achievement of transcendentalism has been to
overcome this scholastic antinomy between realism and nominalism
and to show that mathematical and physical objectivity were nei-
ther ontological nor subjective. Objectivity is always transcendentally
constituted and therefore conditional, relative to eidetico-constitutive
rules. A platonism defined in terms of objectivity and not ontology, is a
transcendental platonism immune to the classical aporias of metaphys-
38See e.g. Maddy [2005] on “na¨ıve realism”, ”robust realism”, “thin realism”, etc.
38
ical transcendent platonism. As far as the question of the continuum is
concerned, the eidetico-constitutive rules are the axioms of set theory
and transcendental platonism means that the continuum problem can
have a well determined solution in a “rigid” universe where R become
conditionally generically absolute. I think that Woodin’s conditional
platonism can therefore be considered as a transcendental platonism
relative to the continuum problem.
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